The trouble started on May 4, 2004,only days after Google’s celebrated coming- out party. Geico, the giant automobile insurer, filed a lawsuit against the search engine for trademark infringement. The insurer claimed the Google’s advertising system unlawfully profited form trademarks that Geico owned. Since all of Google’s revenue and growth was from advertising, the disclosure of the lawsuit appeared ominous. “We are, and may be in the future, subject to intellectual property right claims, which are costly to defend, could require us to pay damages, and could limit our ability to use certain technologies,” Google disclosed in public filing outlining potential risks. Abroad, where Google had promising growth prospects, similar court challenges also arose. “A court in France held us liable for allowing advertisers to select certain trademarked terms as keywords,” the company declared. “We have appealed this decision. We were also subject to two lawsuits in Germany on similar matters.”

To make matters worse, it turned out that prior to its IPO filing, Google had eased its trademark policy in the U.S., allowing companies to place ads even if they were pegged to terms trademarked and owned by others. That was a significant shift, and one, Google warned could increase the risk of lawsuits against the company. It was also a practice that Yahoo, its search engine rival, did not permit. Google claimed it made the policy change to serve users, but some financial analysts said it appeared designed to pump profits before the IPO.

And there was more. Competition form Yahoo and Microsoft posed a greater challenger to Google following the disclosure about its mammoth profitability. With so much money at stake, the intensity of the competition would heat up. Such competition might be good for computer users searching the Internet, but Google said it posed additional risk for potential shareholders. “If Microsoft or Yahoo are successful in providing similar or better Web search results compared to ours or leverage their platforms to make their Web search services easier to access than ours, we could experience a significant decline in user traffic,” the company disclosed. In addition, Google warned that irs momentum seemed seemed unsustainable due to competition and “the inevitable decline in growth rates as our revenues increase to a higher level.”

The there was the question of Googles’s exclusive reliance on advertising, and one particular type of advertising, for all of its revenue. That was potentially quite one particular type of advertising, for all of its revenue. That was potentially quite problematic. If Yahoo or Microsoft gained ground on search, users could flock to their Web sites, and advertisers could follow, “The reduction in spending by; or loss of, advertisers could seriously harm our business,” the company disclosed in its SEC filing.

In the beginning, the firm, earned all of its money from ads triggered by searches on Google.com. But now, most of its growth and half of its sales were coming primarily from the growing network of Web sites that displayed ads Google provided. This self-reinforcing network had a major stake in Google’s successful future. It gave the search engine, operating in the manner of a television network providing ads and programming to network affiliates, a sustainable competitive advantage. But there was a dark side there too, because of the substantial revenue firm a handful of Google partners, notably America Online and the search engine Ask Jeeves. If at any point they left Google and cut a deal with Microsoft or Yahoo, the lost revenue would be immense and difficult to replace. “If one or more of these key relationships is terminated or not renewed, and is not replaced with a comparable relationship, our business would be adversely affected,” the company stated.

Google’s small, nonintrusive text ads wee a big hit. But like major television an cable networks, which were hurt by innovations that enabled users to tune out commercials, the company faced the risk that users could simply turn ads off if mew technologies emerged.

Going public also posed a potentially grave risk to Google’s culture. Life at the Googleplex was informal. Larry and Sergey knew many people by their first names and still signed off on many hires. With rapid growth and an initial public offering, more traditional management and systems would have to be implemented. No more off-theshelf software to track revenue on the cheap. Now it was time for audits by major accounting firms. As Google’s head count and sales increased, keeping it running without destroying its culture was CEO Eric Schmidt’s biggest worry.

Google, the none that became a verb, had built a franchise and a strong brand name with global recognition based entirely on word of mouth. Nothing like it had been done before on this scale. The Internet certainly helped. But Google’s profitability would erode if the company were forced to begin spending the customary sums of money on advertising and marketing to maintain the strength of its brand awareness. Marketing guru Peter Sealey said privately that the advice he gave Google to study consumer perception of the Google brand was rejected by the company and that they were unwilling to spend money on marketing.

Around the turn of the century; and interesting trend was slowly becoming prominent in retailing across the globe. Department stores were slowly becoming prominent in retailing across the globe. Department stores were slowly becoming less and less popular with customers. Large department stores offered a wide range of product categories - from apparel, luggage, toys, crockery, to home furnishing - as well as owned and managed the stock of products they sold inside the store and from their warehouses.Industry analysts started questioning whether this could still be the ideal retail model, and whether the changing retail environment marked the end of large department stores as we knew them.

On one side there were the stores that focussed on a particular category - electronics, toys, women’s wear or home appliances. Over the years, these had evolved into giant superstores and had become very popular with customers who went shopping for a particular product. On the other hand, there were discounters, hypermarkets and wholesale clubs that served the new age shoppers found their ambience to be formal and boring.

To keep pace with these trends, some department stores were steadily reinventing themselves. The most prominent among them was UK based selfridges chain. In 2003, Selfridges launched a new store in Birmingham, England that completely reinvented the idea of the department store. Brands competed with each other within the store but there was no heirarchy of goods: watches competed with each other perfume, and luggage with fashion. In addition the store organised various show stunts and performances through the day and called it, ‘shopping entertainment.’ Similar stores had come up in various parts of Southeast Asia, Japan and Europe. For customers, these new-age department stores seemed like mall, just the they didn’t have the walls that separate the different stores within a mall.

While this trend was becoming more and more apparent abroad, within India too, certain consumer patterns were emerging. Our experience showed that a customer visiting a mall typically walks into four or five stores. That includes a large store and a few smaller brand showrooms. After that fatigue sets in and he or she is unwilling to walk into any more stores at the mall.So we asked ourselves, what would happen if we removed the walls between the different stores in a mall? In that case, a customer would be exposed to multiple brands at the same time, without the necessity of walking in and out of different stores. And along with shopping we could also provide her with other entertainment options.

Within the company itself there was a renewed confidence and an urge to play a larger role in shaping the modern retailing space in India.We had completed more than six years in retailing. With Big Bazaar we had tried and tested our skills at offering a wide range of categories while Pantaloons was firmly positioned in the lifestyle segment. We could now create shopping and entertainment landmarks in the cities in which we had already established a strong presence.

There three insights - the metamorphosis of department stores into developed markets; customer fatigue at the existing shopping malls in India; and the need to create working on, Central. The objective was to create a retail format that was must larger and totally different from what India had seen till then. It would offer everything - from multiple brands for shopping, to restaurants, coffee shops, entertainment options and gaming zones - all under one roof.If we were able to deliver ton these two fronts, we could attract customers from every part of the city and make it the city’s prime shopping destination.

There were a couple of the issues that the Central model addressed quite well. Pantaloons outlets had limited space. We were positioning it as a fashion destination and thr business model was based on selling mostly brands that we owned, or what are called private labels. However, with its increasing popularity; we were being approached by multiple foreign and Indian brands to stock these at Pantaloons. Central, being far bigger in size allowed us to open up a lot of space for other brands paid us a certain percentage of their sales in the mall as commission. Based on the performance of these brands, we could decide on which to keep and which to discard.

The first Central mall was launched in Bangalore in May 2004. Measuring 1,20,000 square feet, it was spread over six floors and housed over three husband brands in categories like apparel, footwear, accessories, home furnishing, music and bools. In addition we had coffee shops, food courts, a Food Bazaar, restaurants, pubs and discotheques. A customer could also book tickets for movies and concerts, book travel tickets and make bill payments.

What has primarily made Central the ‘destination mall’ for Bangalore is its location.It is located in the heart of the city, at M.G. Road, where once Hotel Victoria stood. Moreover, we added a lot of features to further establish it as the focal point of the city.The Central Square located outside the mall building has been made available for art exhibitions, cultural performances, shows and product launches. And in 2005, the vintage car rally was flagged off from the Central flag-point, which has since become the epicenter for many such events.Thus, Central captured in all its glory what we wanted a destination mall to be, and loved up to its tagline of ‘Shop, Eat, and Celebrate.’

Soon after the launch of Bangalore Central, we opened the second Central in Hyderabad in November 2004. Once again it was located at the heart of the city on the Punjagutta Cross Road. Here, the roads connecting the city centre with Secunderabad, Jubllee Hills and the old part of the city; converge. It was more than double the size of Bangalore Central.Apart from over hundreds of brands to shop, it had food courts, restaurants, as well as a five-screen multiplex managed by PVR Cinemas. Much like the one Bangalore, Hyderabad Central didn’t take much time to become the nerve centre of the city.With an annual retail turnover of around Rs 200 crore it is presently among the largest retail destinations in the country.